














The Law of Armed Conflict’s  
“Wicked” Problem:  





























The Law of Armed Conflict’s “Wicked”  





Shane R. Reeves* 
The defense of the nation, an insurrection of the people must be initiated. . . . There is 
absolutely no time for delay.   
    Walther Rathenau, “A Dark Day” (1918)1 
Cyberspace is the new frontier, full of possibilities to advance security and prosperity in 
the 21st century. And yet, with these possibilities, also come new perils and new dangers. 
The Internet is open. It's highly accessible, as it should be. But that also presents a new 
terrain for warfare. It is a battlefield of the future where adversaries can seek to do harm 
to our country, to our economy, and to our citizens. But the even greater danger —the 
greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and it goes beyond harassment. 
A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states [or] violent extremists groups could be as 
destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11. Such a destructive cyber-terrorist attack could 
virtually paralyze the nation.  
    U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta2 
                                                                                                                      
* David Wallace is a Colonel in the United States Army and a Professor and the Dep-
uty Head, Department of Law at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New 
York. Shane Reeves is a Major in the United States Army and an Assistant Professor at the 
United States Military Academy, West Point. 
1. Michael Geyer, People’s War: The German Debate About a Levée en Masse in October 
1918, in THE PEOPLE IN ARMS: MILITARY MYTH AND NATIONAL MOBILIZATION SINCE 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 124 (Daniel Moran & Arthur Waldron eds., 2003).   
2. Leon E. Panetta, Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business 

















    
        ttempting to categorize and label a contemporary armed conflict is a 
complicated task. Not restricted to “hot battlefields,”3 and an amalgamation 
of asymmetric and conventional tactics, modern wars escape traditional con-
flict classifications.4 International or non-international armed conflict and 
irregular or conventional war are no longer workable distinctions as conflict 
participants now engage “along a broad spectrum of operations and lethali-
ty.”5 These aptly titled “hybrid armed conflicts”6 create an unpredictable op-
erational environment7 that is exacerbated by ever-increasing civilian partici-
pation in hostilities8 and the emergence of new technologies.9 Prognostica-
                                                                                                                      
3. “Hot battlefields” is a term used to reference geographically contained conflicts. 
For example, Afghanistan, or, until recently, Iraq would be construed as a hot battlefield. 
See, e.g., Ashley S. Deeks, Pakistan’s Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama Bin Laden, AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS, http://www.asil.org/insights110505.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2012)(“the most controversial aspect . . . is the U.S. argument that this 
conflict can and does extend beyond the “hot battlefield” of Afghanistan to wherever 
members of al Qaeda are found”). 
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 8 
(2010) [hereinafter QDR] (discussing the difficulty in categorizing contemporary con-
flicts). 
5. See Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx? transcrip-
tid=4403 (noting “black and white distinction[s] between irregular war and conventional 
war is an outdated model”); see also QDR, supra note 4, at 8.  
6. See QDR, supra note 4, at 8 (stating “[t]he term ‘hybrid’ has recently been used to 
capture the seemingly increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and 
the blurring between traditional categories of conflict.”); see also Shane R. Reeves & Robert 
E. Barnsby, The New Griffin of International Law: Hybrid Armed Conflicts, HARVARD INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW, Winter 2013, at 16–18, available at http://hir.harvard.edu/mobile-
might/the-new-griffin-of-war (discussing the international legal challenges presented by 
hybrid warfare). 
7. See U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam. 525-3-1, The United States Ar-
my Operating Concept 2016–28, ¶ 2-2(a) (2010) [hereinafter CAPSTONE CONCEPT]. 
8. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE 
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 7 (Nils Melzer ed., 2009) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidance], 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (stating “there 
is little reason to believe that the current trend towards increased civilian participation in 
hostilities will weaken over time”). 












tors believe this trend towards ambiguity in armed conflict is becoming the 
norm rather than the exception.10 Perhaps no domain in modern warfare 
more starkly validates this prediction than cyberspace.11  
Applying the law of armed conflict, as currently constructed, in this en-
vironment is “highly problematic”12 as legal obligations are almost impossi-
ble to discern.13 Recognizing this problem, the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence recently enlisted an international group of 
experts, led by Professor Michael Schmitt of the Naval War College, to draft 
the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare “to help 
government’s deal with the international legal implications of cyber opera-
tions.”14 In hopes of providing clarity for those governments, this recently 
published work attempts to explain how the existing law of armed conflict 
                                                                                                                      
10. See CAPSTONE CONCEPT supra note 7, ¶ 2-2(a); QDR, supra note 4, at iii.  
11. CAPSTONE CONCEPT supra note 7, ¶ 5-7(a) (stating “[a] critical enabler for virtually 
all elements of national and military power, cyberspace has become an increasingly con-
tested domain.”). The overarching importance of cyberspace in modern warfare cannot be 
overstated. See e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT 
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 69 (2010); Stephen W. 
Korns & Joshua E. Kastenberg, Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook, PARAMETERS, Winter 2008–09, 
at 60 (discussing the desperate actions of the Georgian government after it found itself 
unable to communicate through the Internet during the 2008 Georgian-Russian conflict); 
William C. Ashmore, Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks, 11 BALTIC SECURITY & DE-
FENSE REVIEW 4 (2009) (discussing the adverse effects of the 2007 cyber attack on Esto-
nia); David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied 
to Hacking Against U.S., NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, at A1 (describing a series of 
aggressive cyber attacks carried out by Unit 61398, a Chinese military unit, against various 
U.S. government agencies and corporations and the potential responses).  
12. Korns & Kastenberg supra note 11, at 71. 
13. Stephen Daggett, Congressional Research Service, R41250, Quadrennial Defense 
Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning 2 (2010); see also 
Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 831, 833 
(2010)(discussing the difficulties in contemporary armed conflicts due to the “blurring of 
the traditional distinctions and categories upon which the normative edifice of IHL has 
been built”).  
14. See, e.g., Manual Examines How International Law Applies to Cyberspace, IT WORLD, 
(Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.itworld.com/legal/293042/manual-examines-how-internat 
ional-law-applies-cyberwarfare (noting that The Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of 
Excellence, which “assists NATO with technical and legal issues associated with cyber 
warfare related issues,” created the Tallinn Manual to address a variety of cyber legal is-













generally regulates cyber warfare.15 However, when specific provisions of 
the law of armed conflict are applied in cyber warfare, it is apparent that 
generalities do not address the truly “wicked” nature of the problem.16 One 
particular example—trying to reconcile the concept of levée en masse with the 
“cyber conflicts between nations and ad hoc assemblages”—illustrates how 
ill-suited, and often impractical, the existing law of armed conflict can be 
when applied in the cyber context.17  
To support this proposition, this article will begin with a brief discussion 
on the history of a levée en masse. An explanation of how the law of armed 
conflict defines and characterizes the individual battlefield status associated 
with levée en masse will follow. The article will then explore the unique aspects 
of hostilities in cyberspace and delve into the impracticality of applying the 
concept of levée en masse in the context of cyber warfare. It will conclude with 
specific recommendations in terms of the reconceptualising of a levée en masse 
in cyber warfare and a hope that, by focusing on this nuanced provision of 
the law of armed conflict, a broader discussion will ensue.   
 
II. PEOPLE IN ARMS—HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ON THE  
LEVÉE EN MASSE 
 
A distinct type of resistance movement in warfare has been the collective 
uprising limited to the actual period of the invasion of a territory—a levée en 
masse.18 Having acquired something of a mythical status in the history of 
war,19 the underlying concept of a levée en masse is simply that during the ini-
tial invasion, the civilian population of unoccupied territory can spontane-
ously take up arms against the invading army in order to forestall an occupa-
                                                                                                                      
15. The Tallinn Manual examines the “international law governing cyber warfare” and 
encompasses both jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 4 (Michael Schmitt ed., 2013). 
16. “Wicked problems” are generally defined as extraordinarily complex and tricky is-
sues that evade traditional solutions. See generally Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, 
Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POLICY SCIENCES 155 (1973). Instead, novel and 
creative ideas are required to develop a workable answer as a definitive solution may never 
be possible. Id. at 162–63.  
17. Korns & Kastenberg supra note 11, at 70. 
18. KARMA NABULSI, TRADITIONS OF WAR: OCCUPATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE 
LAW 52 (2004).   
19. See Karma Nabulsi, Levée en Masse, CRIMES OF WAR (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/levee-en-masse/ (stating “[t]he levée en masse, or 












tion.20 Underpinning the revolutionary mobilization of a levée en masse is pat-
riotic zeal coupled with the initiative of the citizen-soldier under emergency 
circumstances.21 The levée en masse institutionalizes total war in the context of 
the defense of a nation,22 with all members of the community having a role 
until the enemy had been repelled or defeated.23 As both territorial occupa-
tion and spontaneity are defining characteristics, a levée en masse is a key legal 
classification of participants typically during an early and brief period of an 
armed conflict.  
The law of armed conflict recognizes that a levée en masse occurs when 
inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, without time to form into a regular 
armed unit, spontaneously take up arms to resist an invading force.24 Levée en 
masse participants are considered lawful combatants and are entitled to pris-
oner-of-war status if they carry arms openly and respect the laws and cus-
toms of warfare.25 Endowing levée en masse participants with lawful combat-
ant status recognizes—and reinforces—the belief that “[t]he first duty of a 
citizen is to defend his country, and provided he does so loyally he should 
not be treated as a marauder or criminal.”26 The Lieber Code, the Brussels 
Declaration, the Hague Regulations, and the Third Geneva Convention all 
expressly encapsulate in positive legal provisions the special status given to 
levée en masse participants.27  
                                                                                                                      
20. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 42 (1st ed. 2004). 
21. Dierk Walter, Reluctant Reformers, Observant Disciples: The Prussian Military Reforms, 
1807–1814, in WAR IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION 1775–1815, at 87, 87 (Roger Chickering 
& Stig Forster eds., 2010). 
22. Scott Lytle, Robespierre, Danton, and the Levée en Masse, 30 JOURNAL OF MODERN 
HISTORY 325, 325 (1958). 
23. Alan Forrest, The French Revolution and the First Levée en Masse, in THE PEOPLE IN 
ARMS: MILITARY MYTHS AND NATIONAL MOBILIZATION SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLU-
TION 14 (Daniel Moran & Arthur Waldron eds., 2003). 
24. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(6), Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 200–201(2010)(citing 
Prosecutor v. Delalić, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 268 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugo-
slavia Nov 16, 1998)). 
25. GC III, supra note 24, art. 4A(6). 
26. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 62 (1959).  
27. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 2 CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: PRACTICE 2545–50, §§49–80 (2005) [hereinafter PRAC-













The concept of a levée en masse is deeply rooted in history with its origins 
firmly planted in the French Revolution.28 The French Revolution marked a 
dramatic shift from dynastic warfare between kings to mass participation of 
the populace as citizens took up arms to defend their national soil.29 Based 
on a principle of the nation in arms, the armies of the French Revolution 
represented a significant departure from centuries of tradition regarding mil-
itary organization for warfare.30 On August 23, 1793, the National Conven-
tion under the leadership of its Committee of Public Safety, in one of the 
most celebrated decrees of the French Revolution,31 issued the following 
statement: 
 
From this moment until that in which every enemy has been driven from 
the territory of the Republic, every Frenchman is permanently requisi-
tioned for service with the armies. The young men shall fight; married 
men will manufacture weapons and transport stores; women shall make 
tents and nurse in the hospitals; children shall turn old linen into lint; the 
old men shall report to the public square to raise the courage of the war-
riors and preach the unity of the Republic and hatred against the kings.32  
 
Accordingly, military units were formed on a territorial basis.  In Sep-
tember 1793, recruiting under the levée en masse decree provided over 450,000 
men for the French armies.33 On October 15 of that year,  the concept of 
levée en masse was validated at the Battle of Wattignies as a viable form of 
warfare when the French citizen-army successfully beat back invading regu-
lar military units from Austria.34  
The French, though formalizing the term and concept, are by no means 
alone in using a levée en masse; history is replete with other examples. The 
                                                                                                                      
28. Emily Crawford, Levée en Masse–A Nineteenth Century Concept in a Twenty-First Cen-
tury World 3 (Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11/31, May 2001), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1851947 (noting that the concept originated with the 
French Revolution of 1789).  
29. See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse, PARAMETERS, 
Summer 2006, at 77, 77–78. 
30. GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG, THE ART OF WARFARE IN THE AGE OF NAPOLEON 
95 (1980).  
31. Id. at 100.  
32. Lytle, supra note 22, at 325. 
33. ROTHENBERG, supra note 30, at 100–110. 












Prussian Erhebung, or uprising, fueled the War of Liberation in 181335 as 
Prussian citizens, displaying patriotic feelings and a popular willingness to 
accept sacrifice, flocked to the colors to throw off the French yoke.36 In 
1864, during the United States Civil War, 257 cadets from the Virginia Mili-
tary Institute formed a levée en masse to fight the approaching Union forces at 
the Battle of New Market.37 In the closing months of World War I, a signifi-
cant debate arose among both the German military and national public 
about the possibility of “going French” and waging a people’s war—a 
volkskrieg—against the allies.38 For a variety of political, military and practical 
reasons, the Germans ultimately decided not to use a levée en masse to defend 
the “fatherland.”39  
During World War II, in response to the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union (Operation Barbarossa), the Soviet’s placed “[n]early all inhabitants 
of the country from teenagers to the elderly . . . on call for either labor or 
military duty, and the distinctions between military and civilian life were 
once again erased.”40 Professor Gary Solis, in his award winning book on 
the law of armed conflict, provides a compelling account of a levée en masse 
on Wake Island. He states, in part, as follows:  
 
On December 24, 1941, two weeks after Pearl Harbor, U.S.-held Wake 
Island fell to invading Japanese forces. More than eleven hundred Ameri-
can civilian construction workers were among the island’s population. 
‘More than sixty civilians are known to have taken part in the ground 
fighting and their valor—if not their combat skills—equaled that of the 
servicemen.’ One hundred twenty-four Americans died before Wake Is-
land was forced to surrender. Seventy-five of the dead were civilians who 
manned shore batteries and heavy machine guns, held defensive positions 
and, when Japanese infantry landed, fought in counterattacks.41  
 
In the aftermath of the Balkans War, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia examined the question of whether a levée en masse 
                                                                                                                      
35. Daniel Moran, Arms and the Concert: The Nations in Arms and the Dilemmas of German 
Liberalism, in THE PEOPLE IN ARMS: MILITARY MYTHS AND NATIONAL MOBILIZATION 
SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 52 (Daniel Moran & Arthur Waldron eds., 2003).  
36. See Walter, supra note 21, at 90.  
37. See SOLIS, supra note 24, at 200. 
38. Geyer, supra note 1, at 124-25.  
39. Id. at 124–58.  
40. Mark Von Hagen, People’s War: The German Debate about a Levée en Masse in October 
1918, in THE PEOPLE IN ARMS, supra note 35, at 187–88. 













existed during a portion of the conflict. Evidencing its contemporary rele-
vance, the Trial Chamber concluded that, for a brief period of time, the sit-
uation in and around Srebrenica in 1992 was characterized as a levée en 
masse.42 More recently, in the 2008 armed conflict between Russia and Geor-
gia over the autonomous and de jure demilitarized region known as South 
Ossetia,43 the New York Times reported, in part, that: 
 
As swaths of the country fell before Russian troops, it was not only the 
army that rose in its defense but also regular citizens . . . . [Two young 
Georgian men] hoped to join the fight . . . despite the fact neither had 
served in the military . . . . [They were] part of a group of dozen civilians, 
some in camouflage and some wearing bullet-proof vests, who said they 
were there to defend the city from Russian attack. . . . “Many of them 
now think it is the last chance to defend their homeland.” Ms. Lagidze 
said. “It comes from the knowledge that the army is not enough and eve-
ry man is valuable.”44  
                                                                                                                      
42. Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 135–36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006). Those paragraphs provide as follows: 
 
135. From its inception, the [Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina] sought to pro-
vide its members with means of identification such as uniforms, badges and in-
signia. In the Srebrenica area, however, with the exception of the members of the 
16th East Bosnian Muslim Brigade (“16th Muslim Brigade”) led by Nurif Rizva-
nović, very few individuals possessed a complete uniform in 1992 and 1993. Be-
fore and after the arrival of this brigade in the area in early August 1992, most 
Bosnian Muslim fighters wore makeshift or parts of [Yugoslav People’s Army] 
uniforms. To make up for the lack of adequate clothing, civilians also sometimes 
wore parts of uniforms. There is evidence indicating that during some attacks, 
fighters wore coloured ribbons around their heads or arms for identification 
purposes amongst themselves. Apart from these disparate uniforms and ribbons, 
fighters did not wear fixed distinctive emblems recognizable at a distance. 
 
136. The Trial Chamber comes to the conclusion that while the situation in Sre-
brenica may be characterized as a levée en masse at the time of the Serb takeover 
and immediately thereafter in April and early May 1992, the concept by definition 
excludes its application to long-term situations. Given the circumstances in the 
present case, the Trial Chamber does not find the term levée en masse to be an ap-
propriate characterization of the organizational level of the Bosnian Muslim 
forces at the time and place relevant to the Indictment. 
 
43. Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Runnimeri, Mari Kert, Anna-Maria Taliharm & 
Lis Vihul, Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Georgia%201%200.pdf.  
44. SOLIS, supra note 24, at 200 (citing Nicholas Kulish & Michael Schwirtz, Sons Miss-













As it is extremely likely that in future conflicts there will again be civilian 
fighting forces that spontaneously form to defend their homeland, under-
standing both the historical context and legal definition of levée en masse is 
important. The concept of levée en masse remains a viable contemporary 
combatant status as various modern examples, most notably in the Balkans 
War and the Russian invasion of Georgia, clearly illustrate. Many military 
manuals and legal scholars are cognizant of the historical relevance and 
modern importance of the concept and continue to stress the validity of de-
lineating levée en masse participants as combatants under the law of armed 
conflict.45  
 
III. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND LEVÉE EN MASSE:   
RECOGNIZING AND REGULATING THE REALITIES OF WAR 
 
A levée en masse is a unique and limited battlefield categorization available on-
ly during a portion of a declared war or international armed conflict.46 The 
Third Geneva Convention of 1949 explicitly entitles participants of a levée en 
masse, upon capture, to prisoner-of-war status.47 Qualifying for prisoner-of-
war status means an individual may gain combatant status,48 in contrast to 
                                                                                                                      
45. See generally PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 2546–50. 
46. In the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 2 states, in part, that “the 
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of 
war is not recognized by one of them.” See, e.g., GC III, supra note 24, art. 2. Additionally, 
“[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory 
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” 
Id. Thus, the Third Geneva Convention, including provisions concerning levée en masse, is 
triggered in the event of an international armed conflict, declaration of war, or occupation. 
Id. Levée en masse as a status does not apply during a non-international armed conflict as it 
is not provided for in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Id., art. 3; TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 15, at 102 (noting that a levée en masse does “not apply to non-
international armed conflict”).   
47. See GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(6). 
48. “Combatants are generally defined as anyone engaging in hostilities in an armed 
conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict” and fall “under the definition given in Geneva 
Convention III for those entitled to Prisoner of War status.” INTERNATIONAL & OPERA-
TIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & 
SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 134 (2010)[hereinafter 
DESKBOOK]. Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention lists four categories of com-
batant. See GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(1)–(3), (6). Article 4(A)(6), one of the explicit 













being defined as an unlawful combatant49 or civilian.50 Combatant status, 
which only exists in international armed conflicts and declared wars,51 allows 
levée en masse participants to kill and wound without penalty, provided the 
privilege is not abused by unlawful battlefield acts.52 As combatants, levée en 
masse participants are allowed to be lawfully attacked,53 and as noted above, 
                                                                                                                      
who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading 
forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided 
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.” More generally, com-
batants fall into two alternative categories: (1 )members of the armed forces of a belliger-
ent party (except medical and religious personnel) even if their specific task is not linked to 
active hostilities; and (2) any other person taking an active part in hostilities. DINSTEIN, 
supra note 20, at 27. 
49. The law of armed conflict does not use the term “unlawful combatant” or “un-
privileged belligerent.” However, these terms have become workable references to those 
who engage in combat without meeting the combatant criteria listed in Article 4 of the 
Third Geneva Convention. See generally SOLIS, supra note 24, at 206–11 (discussing the his-
tory of the terms, criticism of the concept and the negative consequences of being an un-
lawful combatant); DESKBOOK, supra note 48, at 96–97.   
50. Despite the obvious significance of distinguishing between combatants and civil-
ians on the battlefield, the Geneva Conventions do not define the term “civilians.” How-
ever, the Commentary to Additional Protocol I states that “the principle protection of the 
civilian population is inseparable from the principle of distinction which should be made 
between military and civilian persons,” therefore “it is essential to have a clear definition 
of each of these categories.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 610 (Yves Sandoz et al. 
eds., 1987). As a result, Additional Protocol I goes on to specifically define a civilian as 
“any person who does not belong to one of the categories referred to in Article 4(A)(1), 
(2), (3) and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol.” Pro-
tocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflict art. 50(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter AP I]. Those listed in Article 4(4) and (5) (examples include journalist and 
others that accompany the armed force) maintain their civilian status, but are afforded the 
special status as a prisoner of war if captured.  
It is important to note that the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I, 
but finds many portions reflect customary international law. See generally Michael J. Mathe-
son, Remarks on the United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 419 (1987). 
51. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 11–12, Rule 3 (2005). 
51. See GREENSPAN, supra note 26, at 3.    
52. SOLIS, supra note 24, at 42. 












afforded prisoner-of-war status upon capture.54 However, “[t]he permissible 
window of opportunity for the raising of and participation in a levée is ex-
tremely narrow.”55 The Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention 
acknowledges that a levée en masse can only exist for a short period of time as 
it is a spontaneous uprising and will eventually take on structure or no long-
er be in unoccupied territory.56 Thus, if the levée en masse continues beyond 
the initial invasion, “the authority commanding the inhabitants who have 
taken up arms, or the authority to which they profess allegiance, must either 
replace them by sending regular units, or must incorporate them in its regu-
lar forces.”57 
Recognizing the temporal nature of a levée en masse, participants receive 
combatant status under relaxed conditions and are exempt from two of the 
four conditions required of other irregular troops.58 These other irregular 
troops, whether members of militia, other volunteer corps or those of orga-
nized resistance belonging to a party to a conflict, may be considered com-
batants and receive the resultant privileges, provided they fulfill the follow-
ing four conditions: 
 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operation in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war.59 
 
In contrast, levée en masse participants are neither required to be com-
manded by a person responsible for his subordinates nor wear a fixed dis-
                                                                                                                      
54. See GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(6). The United States law of land warfare field 
manual states that “[s]hould some inhabitants of a locality thus take part in its defense, it 
might be justifiable to treat all the males of military age as prisoners of war.” U.S. Depart-
ment of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 28 (Change 1, 1976)[hereinafter 
FM 27-10]. The manual goes on to say that “[e]ven if inhabitants who formed the levée en 
masse lay down their arms and return to their normal activities” they may still be made 
prisoners of war. Id. 
55. Crawford, supra note 28, at 13. 
56. COMMENTARY, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR 68 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960)[hereinafter COMMENTARY, GC III].  
57. Id. See also Crawford, supra note 28, at 13.  
58. See GREENSPAN, supra note 26, at 62; GC III, supra note 23, art. 4(A)(2).  













tinctive sign to receive combatant status.60 Given that a levée en masse is a 
spontaneous, unorganized movement61 acting under emergency conditions 
to desperately defend a nation,62 it is understandable that the inhabitants of 
the territory will not have sufficient time to organize into units and have dis-
tinctive signs. Though justifiable, these relaxed combatant qualification 
standards significantly diminish the ability of an armed force fighting a levée 
en masse to distinguish between a civilian and a combatant.63 Thus, “the re-
quirement of carrying arms ‘openly’ is of special significance and has a more 
precise implication”64 for both the levée en masse participants and their adver-
saries. For those fighting a levée en masse, the only distinguishing characteristic 
between a protected civilian and a combatant, and, therefore, who can be 
lawfully attacked, is the open carrying of arms. For levée en masse participants, 
“this requirement is in the interest of [the] combatants themselves who must 
be recognizable in order to qualify for treatment as prisoners of war.”65 
Recognizing both the realities of a levée en masse and the criticality of protect-
ing civilians, the law of armed conflict places singular emphasis on the es-
sential need for those choosing to participate in a spontaneous uprising to 
“carry arms visibly.”66  
The concept of levée en masse, though narrower and more specific than 
originally espoused during the French Revolution, remains a contemporary 
combatant category.67 Yet, as the law of armed conflict struggles to maintain 
the balance between military necessity and humanity in modern warfare,68 
particularly in cyber conflicts, the viability of a levée en masse must be ques-
tioned. A spontaneous uprising of a nation’s citizenry to defend the unoc-
cupied portions of their territory is a far different paradigm than a cyber 
mobilization.    
                                                                                                                      
60. See id.; GREENSPAN, supra note 26, at 62. See also FM 27-10, supra note 54, at 28 
(stating “[i]f the enemy approaches an area for the purpose of seizing it, the inhabitants, if 
they defend it, are entitled to the rights of regular combatants as a levée en masse although 
they wear no distinctive sign”). 
61. GREENSPAN, supra note 26, at 62. 
62. SOLIS, supra note 24, at 201. 
63. See supra note 48 for membership criteria for a levée en masse. 
64. COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 56, at 68. 
65. Id.  
66. Id.  
67. See Crawford, supra note 28, at 13 (stating “[a]s the concept of levée en masse has 
evolved and developed over the decades, it has become a far narrower concept than origi-
nally espoused during the French Revolution.”). 
68. See generally Reeves & Barnsby, supra note 6, at 16–18 (discussing the difficulties of 













IV. LEVÉE EN MASSE IN CYBER WARFARE:  
TECHNOLOGY MEETS TRADITION—AN ANALYSIS 
 
The Tallinn Manual, the non-binding, yet authoritative interpretation of how 
the existing law of armed conflict applies to cyber warfare, addresses many 
critically important issues.69 Of particular note is the Manual’s Rule 27, 
which states that “in an international armed conflict, inhabitants of an unoc-
cupied territory who engage in cyber operations as part of a levée en masse en-
joy combatant immunity and prisoner of war status.”70 In validating the no-
tion of a cyber levée en masse, the international group of experts acknowledges 
the problematic nature of applying the concept to cyber warfare by high-
lighting various unanswered and troubling questions in the commentary to 
Rule 27.71 Additionally, the experts were “divided as to whether the privileg-
es associated with the levée en masse concept apply to a civilian population 
countering a massive cyber attack, the affects of which are comparable to 
those of a physical invasion by enemy forces.”72 Unable to come to a con-
sensus, a majority of the experts decided that the concept is only applicable 
when there is a physical invasion of national territory.  Put differently, a 
cyber levée en masse is only possible when responding to a traditional invasion 
of territory by a conventional force.73  It is not permitted in the face of an 
attack that consists only of cyber operations. 
The Tallinn Manual’s preservation, yet conservative treatment, of the 
concept of levée en masse is consistent with the belief that 
 
[t]he development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not re-
quire a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render ex-
isting international norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms 
guiding state behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also apply in cy-
berspace. Nonetheless, unique attributes of networked technology require 
additional work to clarify how these norms apply and what additional un-
derstandings might be necessary to supplement them.74  
                                                                                                                      
69. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1. 
70. Id. at 102. 
71. See id. at 102–03, cmt. to Rule 27(discussing various problems with the concept of 
a cyber levée en masse). 
72. Id. at 103. 
73. Id.  
74. See THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROS-














Though this approach has merit, there is an equally compelling argu-
ment that it is critical to resolve the problems associated with extending the 
levée en masse concept to cyberspace. At the forefront of these problems is 
the inability to distinguish between a cyber levée en masse combatant and a 
protected civilian. As a levée en masse is a spontaneous uprising, inhabitants 
are expected to be participants in impulsively organized groups75 that are 
only distinguishable as combatants by the open and visible carrying of 
arms.76 There is no confusion as to what “arms” may mean in the context of 
a traditional levée en masse, as conventional weapons such as rifles, pistols and 
similar armaments are clearly contemplated.77 Levée en masse participants, with 
no distinctive signs recognizable from a distance, are therefore expected to 
ostensibly carry traditionally recognized weapons since this is the only ex-
ternal display advertising their combatant status.78  
This singular distinction requirement is not possible in a cyber war 
where the weapons are computers. Though a computer at times may be 
construed as a “weapon,”79 simple possession cannot be interpreted to be 
indicative of combatant activity. As the Tallinn Manual notes, “even if [com-
puters] qualify as weapons, the requirement to carry arms openly has little 
application in the cyber context,”80 thus verifying that this most important 
of distinguishing characteristics is nonexistent. Without a visible weapon, 
there is no meaningful way to distinguish a theoretical cyber levée en masse 
from the civilian population. 
The irrelevance of geography in cyberspace and the limited cyber exper-
tise of a territory’s population both further contribute to this significant dis-
tinction problem.81 Cyber warfare’s attractiveness is partially due to the abil-
                                                                                                                      
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cy
berspace.pdf. 
75. GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(6).  
76. See COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 56, at 67–68; supra text accompanying notes 
61–66.   
77. See COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 56, at 61(discussing the requirement of car-
rying arms openly, referring to weapons such as a hand grenade or a revolver). 
78. See id. at 61, 67. 
79. The Tallinn Manual defines a cyber weapon as “cyber means of warfare that are by 
design, use, or intended use capable of causing either (i)injury to, or death of, persons; (ii) 
damage to, or destruction of objects, that is, causing the consequences required for quali-
fication of a cyber operation as an attack.” TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 141–42. 
80. Id. at 100. 












ity of an individual to effectively organize a cyber campaign,82 while remain-
ing safely anonymous from an undisclosed location.83 “Territory” is a non-
factor in cyber warfare; the location of the cyber attacker, the digital infra-
structure transmitting the attack and the target are widely dispersed and not 
bound by an occupied/unoccupied paradigm.84 The territorial component 
that helps define a levée en masse, specifically that the uprising will remain re-
stricted to “unoccupied territory,” thus does not comport with the realities 
of cyber warfare.85 Further, “the means and expertise necessary to engage 
effectively in cyber operations may be relatively limited in the population,” 
eliminating the possibility of a mass uprising.86 When comparing the histori-
cal narrative of a levée en masse—large numbers of armed citizens spontane-
ously coalescing in order to repel invaders—to the cyber version—
technically skilled citizens discreetly using their computers from an undis-
closed location to attack invaders87—the stark differences highlight the flaws 
in trying to apply the traditional concept in the cyber domain. A small dis-
persed group of citizens not limited to simply protecting unoccupied territo-
ry, but conducting cyber operations possibly deep inside enemy territory, is 
contrary to the conceptual underpinnings of a levée en masse.88 Given the un-
likely ability of a population to conduct a mass cyber uprising or for techni-
cally proficient citizens to limit a cyber attack to those forces “at the front,” 
                                                                                                                      
82. Korns & Kastenberg supra note 11, at 70. 
83. See, e.g., Kelly Gables, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet against Cyberterrorism 
and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 57, 57 (2010) (discussing the unlimited reach of terrorist activity over the Internet).  
84. Illustrating the irrelevance of geographic borders in cyberspace, author P.W. Sing-
er noted when describing a Hezbollah cyber assault on Israel in 2006 that the attack “orig-
inally appeared to come from a small south Texas cable company, a suburban Virginia 
cable provider and web-hosting servers in Delhi, Montreal, Brooklyn, and New Jersey,” 
while in actuality “these all had actually been ‘hijacked’ by Hezbollah hackers.” P.W. 
SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 264 (2009).  
85. See Korns & Kastenberg supra note 11, at 70 (“Existing international laws of war 
are generally based on the notion of ‘borders’ in that these laws primarily govern conflicts 
between nation-states with recognized geographic boundaries. This construct is funda-
mentally weak in addressing borderless, nonstate actor participation in cyber conflict 
where individuals organize their own cyber campaigns.”). 
86. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 154, at 103. 
87. Id. (discussing how a cyber levée en masse may theoretically form).   
88. Id. (noting that historically, levée en masse did not “contemplate military operations 
deep inside enemy territory, it is questionable whether individuals launching cyber opera-
tions against enemy military objectives other than the invading forces can be considered a 













neither significant population participation nor geography can be considered 
distinguishing characteristics of a theoretical cyber levée en masse.  
A cyber levée en masse is simply an unworkable notion whose continued 
viability increases the likelihood of greater indiscriminate targeting of the 
civilian population. Preserving a combatant category that lacks any distinc-
tive indicators creates a murky environment89 in which civilians may easily 
be mistaken for combatants.90 One of the primary purposes of the law of 
armed conflict is to protect civilians,91 as explicitly articulated in the princi-
ple of distinction,92 thus “it is of the utmost importance that all feasible 
measures be taken to prevent the exposure of the civilian population to er-
roneous or arbitrary targeting.”93 In contrast, a cyber levée en masse combatant 
category increases “confusion and uncertainty as to the distinction between 
legitimate military targets and persons protected against direct attack”94 and 
therefore acts in direct opposition to this well-established principle. Wheth-
er due to the irresolvable distinction problem, or because of a complete dis-
similarity between a traditional levée en masse and the cyber variant, it is un-
tenable to maintain this combatant category in cyber warfare.  
A more reasonable solution, which both enforces the principle of dis-
tinction and protects assemblages of cyber participants, is to require these 
groups to comply with a modified version of criteria required for other ir-
regular troops, such as militias, volunteer corps or organized militia move-
ments.95 Because the existing criteria for traditional irregular troops to gain 
combatant status include “carrying arms openly,”96 strict compliance with 
this requirement is not possible in any cyber context.97 But unlike the con-
cept of levée en masse, which places special significance on carrying arms 
                                                                                                                      
89. Distinguishing parties to the conflict in cyberspace is recognized as extraordinarily 
difficult. See Korns & Kastenberg supra note 11, at 70. 
90. See Melzer, supra note 13, at 833.  
91. See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 4 (stating that “the protection of 
civilians is one of the main goals of international humanitarian law”). 
92. The principle of distinction states that “in order to ensure respect for and protec-
tion of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives. . . .” AP I, supra note 50, art. 48.   
93. ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 7. 
94. Melzer, supra note 13, at 833.  
95. See GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(2); text and accompanying notes 56-57(listing 
the four criteria for irregular troops to gain combatant status). 
96. See GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(2)(c)(noting that the third cumulative condition 
for combatant status is “that of carrying arms openly”).  












openly,98 this requirement is not the only manner in which to recognize an 
irregular troop as a combatant. Carrying arms openly is of diminished im-
portance in the irregular troop combatant category as other external signs, in 
particular “being commanded by a person”99 and “having a fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance,” help distinguish these groups from civil-
ians.100 Though unfeasible in the context of a levée en masse,101 eliminating this 
requirement as a qualification for an irregular cyber troop is a possibility due 
to the alternative distinguishing criteria.  
Additionally, the remaining militia, volunteer corps and organized re-
sistance movement membership criteria more accurately reflect current 
cyber war conditions than does the notion of a levée en masse. Limited tech-
nical expertise, coupled with the global scope of the cyber domain,102 makes 
a spontaneous, geographically restricted mass cyber uprising an unrealistic, 
or, at best, extremely remote possibility.103 A more likely scenario is a group 
of cyber-capable citizens, who possess the requisite technical expertise, in-
conspicuously organizing to engage an invading force in cyber warfare.104 
Organization of the cyber-capable citizens and the unrestricted use of cyber-
space to affect the invading force are analogous to irregular troops being 
under command and allowed to operate “in or outside their own territory, 
                                                                                                                      
98. See COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 56, at 67–68; supra text accompanying notes 
62–64.  
99. “The condition of being commanded by a person responsible for subordinates is 
best understood as an aspect of the requirement that the group be ‘organized.’” TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 15, at 98. As noted in the Manual, a group that is organized solely 
over the Internet will not qualify as an organized armed group as they will “have difficulty 
establishing that they are acting under a responsible commander” or “subject to an inter-
nal disciplinary system capable of enforcing compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict.” 
Id. Therefore, physical organization is required to gain combatant status. See id.  
100. GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(2)(a)(b). 
101. The Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention, recognizing the critical im-
portance of a levée en masse visibly carrying their weapons in order to be distinguished as 
combatants explains the difference between carrying arms “openly” and carrying them 
“visibly.” COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 56, at 61. 
102. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 258–60 (defining cyberspace broadly and 
describing the Internet as “global”). 
103. “At the core” of the levée en masse concept is “the notion of spontaneity and brev-
ity.” Crawford, supra note 28, at 13. Gathering together those who have the technical ex-
pertise to conduct a concerted cyber attack will take effort and will unlikely comport to the 
understanding of “spontaneous.”  
104. See Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 11 at 70 (discussing the “the growing trend 













even if [that] territory is occupied.”105 Some may question the likelihood of a 
cyber group wearing “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”;106 
however, since there are only a limited number of distinctive characteristics 
available in the cyber context, there is “no basis for deviating from” this 
general requirement if the group is to be afforded combatant immunity and 
prisoner-of-war status.107 Similarly, as compliance with the law of armed 
conflict is a universal requirement for maintaining combatant status, this 
criterion obviously remains unchanged. For those individuals or loosely af-
filiated groups that choose to participate in cyber operations without meet-
ing the modified membership criteria for a militia, volunteer corps or an or-
ganized resistance movement, they may be taking a direct part in hostili-
ties.108 In doing so, they risk divesting themselves of their civilian protec-
tions, thereby becoming subject to targeting and prosecution for belligerent 
acts.109  
“When bombs and bullets fly, identification of warring parties is rela-
tively easy; but not so for cyber activities,”110 thus the need for greater clarity 
in defining a combatant in cyber warfare. Despite this necessity, the Tallinn 
Manual preserves the idea of a cyber levée en masse, thus maintaining a com-
batant status that is indistinguishable from the civilian population. In doing 
so, it ignores the contemporary realities of cyber warfare. This is dangerous 
and requires a workable alternative that provides the same opportunities for 
assemblages of cyber participants during the traditional period of a levée en 
masse. The membership criteria for the militia, volunteer corps or an orga-
nized resistance movement, modified for the cyber context, fills this need as 
it creates a combatant category for cyber capable citizens without the irre-
solvable issues of a levée en masse.    
                                                                                                                      
105. GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(2).  
106. Id., art. 4(A)(2)(b).  
107. Though there is “no basis for deviating from this general requirement for those 
engaged in cyber operations,” there are questions as to whether there are exceptions. See 
generally TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 99. Regardless of whether customary interna-
tional law recognizes exceptions to this requirement in regards to a traditional militia, vol-
unteer corps or organized resistance movements, in the context of cyber war this require-
ment has greater importance due to the limited number of distinctive characteristics avail-
able.  
108. See AP I, supra note 50, art. 51(3). 
109. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Par-
ticipation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 1 
(2010) (discussing the consequences of a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities). 













V. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 
 
Levée en masse, where “inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, on the ap-
proach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forc-
es, without having time to form themselves into regular armed units,” pro-
vides both prisoner-of-war protections and combatant immunity to individ-
ual participants if they “carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs 
of war.”111 The requirements of spontaneous mass uprising, protecting non-
occupied territory and “carrying arms openly” have special significance as 
these are essentially the only distinguishing characteristics of a levée en 
masse.112 Because cyberspace is a borderless domain, where computers are 
the weapons and groups discreetly coalesce,113 the concept of levée en masse 
becomes an unworkable anachronism whose application diminishes various 
protections afforded both civilians and conflict participants in armed con-
flicts.114 Rather than forcibly applying a concept that is incongruous in this 
new domain, a more practical solution is to eliminate levée en masse as a com-
batant category in cyber conflicts and instead require all assemblages of 
cyber participants, either ad hoc or pre-existing, to generally comply with 
the criteria that define militias, volunteer corps or organized resistance 
movements.115  
In contrast to levée en masse, this combatant category eliminates the im-
portance of territorial occupation116 and helps distinguish individual com-
puter attacks from an organized cyber operation. Admittedly, this is not a 
perfect solution since computers are the exclusive tool used in cyberspace, 
and one of the qualifying conditions for militias, volunteer corps or orga-
                                                                                                                      
111. GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(6). 
112. COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 56, at 68. 
113. QDR, supra note 4, at ix; Korns & Kastenberg supra note 11, at 70 (stating “in-
ternational laws of war . . . are fundamentally weak in addressing borderless, nonstate actor 
participation in cyber conflict where individuals organize their own cyber campaigns”). 
114. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 89–94 for a discussion on how applying 
the concept of levée en masse in a cyber conflict potentially increases indiscriminate targeting 
of civilians and confuses combatant status.  
115. GC III, supra note 24, art. 4(A)(2). The following four conditions must be ful-
filled to qualify for this provision: “(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible 
for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with 
the laws and customs of war.”  
116. Id., art. 4(A)(2)(noting that members of this combatant category may operate “in 













nized resistance movements includes the requirement to “carry arms open-
ly.”117 However, unlike a levée en masse, this category greatly diminishes the 
importance of “carry[ing] arms openly” by providing a variety of other crite-
ria to help distinguish combatants from civilians.118 If extended to include 
spontaneous cyber uprisings, the carrying arms openly requirement could be 
eliminated, while participants could remain in compliance with the principle 
of distinction through other means.119 For those cyber assemblages not 
complying with the conditions that would categorize participants as mem-
bers of a militia, volunteer corps or organized resistance movement as those 
apply to all other conflicts, individuals retain their civilian status until taking 
a direct part in hostilities.120 Eliminating a possible levée en masse in cyber con-
flict and emphasizing the criteria, albeit slightly modified, defining militias, 
volunteer corps or organized resistance movements helps demarcate the line 
between a combatant and civilian in the ambiguous cyber war environment.  
The impracticality of applying the concept of levée en masse in cyberspace, 
and the subsequent need to modify criteria for the irregular troop combat-
                                                                                                                      
117. Id., art. 4(A)(2)(c).  
118. For example, a “fixed distinctive sign,” command structure and belonging to a 
party to the conflict. Id., art. 4(A)(2)(c).  
119. “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and ci-
vilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. . . .” AP I, 
supra note 50, art. 48. The distinction requirement also applies in non-international armed 
conflict. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict art. 13, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II] (stating “civilians shall enjoy the protection afford-
ed by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”); SOLIS, 
supra note 24, at 254 (discussing the applicability of the principle of distinction in all con-
flicts); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC ‘Direct Partic-
ipation in Hostilities’ Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 641, 646 (2010) (“[c]ompliance with the distinction principle 
is required of all participants in warfare regardless of whether they fight for state armed 
forces or a non-State ‘organized armed group’”). 
120. “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. AP I, supra note 50, art. 51(3); AP II, supra note 
119, art. 13. There is much debate concerning what constitutes “a direct part in hostilities” 
in not only the cyber context, but in traditional forms of warfare. Compare ICRC Interpre-
tive Guidance, supra note 8, at 5–6 (“The Interpretive Guidance provides a legal reading of the 
notion of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ with a view to strengthening the implementa-
tion of the principle distinction.”) with Watkin, supra note 119, at 641 and Schmitt, supra 
note 109, at 5 (criticizing the Interpretive Guidance recommendations). Though this particular 
issue is outside the purview of this paper, it again illustrates the difficulties faced when 












ant category, highlights the immense challenge of regulating cyber warfare 
with the existing law of armed conflict. Cyberspace—“a global domain with-
in the information environment that encompasses the interdependent net-
works of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet and 
telecommunication networks”121—is quickly becoming a decisive battle-
ground in warfare.122 National armed forces, more specifically, technologi-
cally advanced militaries, are highly dependent upon their information net-
works for command and control, intelligence, logistics and weapon technol-
ogy.123 The result of this dependency is that “modern armed forces simply 
cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without . . . assured access 
to cyberspace.”124 However, access to cyberspace is not limited to techno-
logically advanced militaries as State actors with scarce resources, non-State 
armed groups or even individuals125 are capable of cyber participation from 
almost any location.126 Ease of access, widespread computer sophistication 
and cheap “hacker tools” allow this broad range of actors to create a stag-
gering number of vulnerabilities for a cyber-reliant military.127 Further, the 
anonymity and borderless nature of cyberspace incentivizes hostile actors to 
exploit these vulnerabilities,128 making computer attacks an attractive meth-
od of warfare.129 Cyber warfare, with all its concomitant legal issues is thus 
                                                                                                                      
121. See QDR, supra note 4, at 37. 
122. Id.  
123. Id. 
124. Id.  
125. See, e.g., Lee Ferran, Former CIA Counter-Terror Chief: Al Qaeda Will Go Cyber, (ABC 
Nightly News television broadcast Aug. 4, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cia-
counter-terror-chief-al-qaeda-cyber/story?id=14224256 (noting that Al-Qaeda has specifi-
cally called for cyber attacks as they can be done remotely and individually); Duncan 
Gardham, Terrorists are harnessing hi-tech communications, government warns, TELEGRAPH (July 12, 
2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8633311/Terroris 
ts-are-harnessing-hi-tech-communications-government-warns.html (discussing Al-Qaeda’s 
guidance for individuals to act independently as they conduct “cyber jihad.”). 
126. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 84, at 264.  
127. See QDR, supra note 4, at 37. 
128. See, e.g., Global Hacking Network Declares Internet War on Syria, REUTERS (Nov. 30, 
2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/syria-crisis-internet-anynymous-idIND 
EE8AT0C320121130 (“Global hacking network Anonymous said it will shut down Syrian 
government websites around the world in response to a countrywide Internet blackout 
believe aimed at silencing the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad.”). 
129. See U.S. Cyber Command: Organizing for Cyberspace Operations: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Armed Services, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Rep. Skelton, Chairman, H. 













becoming a regular occurrence as historically marginalized actors are drawn 
to the unprecedented opportunities—and limited risks—presented in the 
cyber domain.130  
As cyber warfare becomes common, the international community can-
not continue to rely on a static version of the existing law of armed conflict 
to resolve the “wicked” problems inherent in the “fifth domain.”131 Only by 
looking beyond lex lata,132 or how the existing law of armed conflict applies 
in cyber warfare,133 and exploring lex ferenda,134 or what the law in cyberspace 
should be, will States begin to develop solutions to the legal ambiguity that 
permeates cyber warfare and gain the clarity needed for operating in cyber-
space. In modern warfare the “pace of change continues to accelerate,”135 
often straining the ability of the law of armed conflict to regulate contempo-
rary conflicts. No emerging form of warfare creates more ambiguous legal 
questions than does cyber war, thus posing a great threat to the continued 
vitality of the law of armed conflict. Just as global militaries are adapting 
their doctrine, tactics and force structure to address the realities of cyber-
space,136 innovations in the law are necessary for effective regulation of this 
new domain. Addressing this threat is of paramount importance, as proac-
tively keeping the law of armed conflict relevant maintains the delicate bal-
                                                                                                                      
from criminals, terrorist organizations, and more recently from more than 100 foreign 
intelligence organizations.”). 
130. See id. (statement of Rep. Skelton, Chairman, H. Comm. on Armed Services) 
(“[U.S] information systems face thousands of attacks a day from criminals, terrorist or-
ganizations, and more recently from more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations.”). 
131. Along with land, sea, air and space, cyberspace is considered the fifth domain of 
warfare. See War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 25, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792. See also QDR, supra note 4, at 37 (“Alt-
hough it is a man-made domain, cyberspace is now as relevant a domain for DoD activi-
ties as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air, and space.”).   
132. Lex lata is defined as “what the law is.” See J. Jeremy Marsh, Lex Lata or Lex 
Ferenda? Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 198 MILI-
TARY LAW REVIEW 116, 117 (2008). 
133. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 5. The Manual notes that its purpose is to 
explain the “law currently governing cyber conflict” and “does not set forth lex ferenda, 
best practices, or preferred policies.” Id. 
134. Lex ferenda is defined as “what the law should be.” See Marsh, supra note 132, at 
117. 
135. QDR, supra note 4, at iii. 
136. See, e.g., QDR, supra note 4, at 62 (“rising complexity in sea, air, space and cyber-
space domains pose new security challenges that require innovative adjustments to our 
defense posture.”). See also Reeves & Barnsby, supra note 6, at 17 (discussing the adverse 












ance between military necessity and humanity, which ensures the primacy of 
the law remains unquestioned.    
 
 
 
